Taliban posted a statement on their website, shahamat.org, saying they pose no threat to the West.
According to Reuters, the statement reads: “We had and have no plan of harming countries of the world, including those in Europe … our goal is the independence of the country and the building of an Islamic state.” the statement went on to say that the Afghan Taliban were prepared for "a long war" if foreign troops "want to colonize the country of proud and pious Afghans under the baseless pretext of a war on terror."
According to Reuters, the statement reads: “We had and have no plan of harming countries of the world, including those in Europe … our goal is the independence of the country and the building of an Islamic state.” the statement went on to say that the Afghan Taliban were prepared for "a long war" if foreign troops "want to colonize the country of proud and pious Afghans under the baseless pretext of a war on terror."
Here is the analysis from a source that brings an interesting perspective
Comment: The point worth noting is that the Taliban posting reinforces the statement on Sunday by US National Security Advisor Jones that there are fewer than 100 al Qaida in Afghanistan. Al Qaida is not welcome in Afghanistan by either side of the fight.
After their ouster from Kandahar in 2001, the Taliban openly derided the Arabs of al Qaida and blamed them for the Taliban’s misfortunes. They vowed never to allow the foreigners -- especially the haughty, insensitive Arabs -- back into Afghanistan, consistent with the history of Pashtun xenophobia. They have been true to that vow ever since, as General Jones confirmed, indirectly.
The premise that Afghanistan would become an al Qaida safe haven under any future government is alarmist and bespeaks a lack of understanding of the Pashtuns on this issue and a superficial knowledge of recent Afghan history.
In December 2001, Omar was ridiculed in public by his own commanders for inviting the “Arabs” and other foreigners, which led to their flight to Pakistan. The worst atrocities committed by the vice and virtue cops of the Taliban government were committed by the foreign thugs who accompanied bin Laden, according to media reports at the time. The Afghans did not behave that way against their own people, though they were brutish against the Soviets.
There is no factual basis for presuming that support for international Islamic terror is the norm in Afghanistan, rather than a tragic mistake. More than a thousand years of history reinforces the ethnic trait of visceral hatred of outsiders of all kind. Omar’s experience with the bin Laden and the Arabs revalidates the ancient wisdom.
There are no good guys, but any successful strategy in Afghanistan will include the Pashtuns in some kind of power sharing arrangement. No matter who governs in Kabul in the future, bin Laden and al Qaida will not find a safe haven in Afghanistan again because almost all Afghans continue to agree on that point after eight years.
For the record, the leading exporters of violent revolutionary doctrines today are the remnants of al Qaida in Pakistan and Iran via the Revolutionary Guards Quds force and its Hizballah proxies. Pakistan is just a regional supporter of terror against its neighbors, but so is India from time to time.
After their ouster from Kandahar in 2001, the Taliban openly derided the Arabs of al Qaida and blamed them for the Taliban’s misfortunes. They vowed never to allow the foreigners -- especially the haughty, insensitive Arabs -- back into Afghanistan, consistent with the history of Pashtun xenophobia. They have been true to that vow ever since, as General Jones confirmed, indirectly.
The premise that Afghanistan would become an al Qaida safe haven under any future government is alarmist and bespeaks a lack of understanding of the Pashtuns on this issue and a superficial knowledge of recent Afghan history.
In December 2001, Omar was ridiculed in public by his own commanders for inviting the “Arabs” and other foreigners, which led to their flight to Pakistan. The worst atrocities committed by the vice and virtue cops of the Taliban government were committed by the foreign thugs who accompanied bin Laden, according to media reports at the time. The Afghans did not behave that way against their own people, though they were brutish against the Soviets.
There is no factual basis for presuming that support for international Islamic terror is the norm in Afghanistan, rather than a tragic mistake. More than a thousand years of history reinforces the ethnic trait of visceral hatred of outsiders of all kind. Omar’s experience with the bin Laden and the Arabs revalidates the ancient wisdom.
There are no good guys, but any successful strategy in Afghanistan will include the Pashtuns in some kind of power sharing arrangement. No matter who governs in Kabul in the future, bin Laden and al Qaida will not find a safe haven in Afghanistan again because almost all Afghans continue to agree on that point after eight years.
For the record, the leading exporters of violent revolutionary doctrines today are the remnants of al Qaida in Pakistan and Iran via the Revolutionary Guards Quds force and its Hizballah proxies. Pakistan is just a regional supporter of terror against its neighbors, but so is India from time to time.
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